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1. Introduction 
 
International civil aviation has without doubts worked as one of the strongest drivers 
of globalization for the past 30 years. It is paradoxical that although it helped 
liberalize multiple industries, the aviation sector itself remains highly protectionist, 
governed by 60-year-old framework of the Chicago conference. 
 
In 1944, United States of America organized an inter-governmental conference in 
Chicago. The aim was obvious: to create a liberal international aviation regime, 
where all the airlines from all the countries of the world would have the same rights 
and would be able to operate scheduled flights between any major airports without 
restrictions. Unfortunately, this attitude wasn’t shared by the majority of participants. 
A group of mainly European countries led by the United Kingdom preferred a more 
protectionist structure. The aviation infrastructure of European countries had been 
severely damaged in the Second World War – therefore, they felt a liberal regime 
would serve the interests of the United States and would increase their dominance in 
civil aviation. Thus, since the Chicago conference, economic structure of 
international civil aviation has been based on bilateral air service agreements 
(ASAs). 
 
Scheduled air transportation services can only be operated between countries that 
have signed an ASA. ASAs contain a set of rules valid for air transport between the 
two signatory countries: they specify permitted routes, designate airlines, set 
capacity, frequency and pricing restrictions. As every country-pair in the world 
needs to have an ASA to establish aviation relations and every ASA is a separate 
treaty containing different combination of provisions, the system based on ASAs is 
very robust and complicated. If we take into account that there are approximately 
200 countries today we come to a total of 20,000 agreements needed for trouble-free 
aviation relations between all the countries! 
 
The nature of air transport agreements ranges from very restrictive to completely 
liberal. The most important factor in determining how liberal an ASA is, is market 
access. Market access is granted in terms of “freedoms of the air”. There are nine 
freedoms of the air. The first two of them – also called “technical freedoms” – are 
included in all the ASAs and they constitute a right of an airline from the first 
country to overfly or to make a technical stop in another country. Freedoms three-
five are “commercial freedoms”. They include a right to carry passengers from the 
home country to another country and back, and the right to carry passengers from 
the home country to another country with a stop in a third country. Freedoms six-
eight are combinations of the first five freedoms. The ultimate freedom is called 
cabotage: it is a right of an air carrier to operate independent domestic flights in a 
foreign state. 
 
The freedoms of the air are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 1: The freedoms of the air 
Technical freedoms 
1
st
 freedom To overfly one country en-route to another country. B 
2
nd
 freedom To make a technical stop in another country. B 
Basic commercial freedoms 
3
rd
 freedom To carry PCM from the home country to another country. A-B 
4
th
 freedom To carry PCM to the home country from another country. B-A 
5
th
 freedom To carry PCM from the home country to another country, 
then continuing to a third country. 
A-B-C 
Derived freedoms and cabotage 
6
th
 freedom To carry PCM between two foreign countries with a stop 
in the home country. 
B-A-C 
7
th
 freedom To carry PCM between two foreign countries without a 
stop in the home country. 
B-C 
8
th
 freedom To carry PCM from the home country to another country, 
then continuing to another airport in the same country. 
A-B-B 
9
th
 freedom Cabotage. B-B 
A – home country, B a C – foreign countries 
PCM – passengers, cargo and mail 
 
ASAs differ in number of freedoms granted. The more freedoms they include, the 
more liberal they are. Technically, an ASA containing all nine freedoms would 
imply a common aviation market between the signatory countries. 
 
 
 
2. Partial liberalization and its effects 
 
Until 1978, almost all ASAs were restrictive in terms of market access, that is, 
points to be served, and capacity and price controls.
1
 They used to include only first 
to fourth freedoms, designate single airline and set strict limits on capacity and 
tariffs. The driver of change was – as in many other cases – the United States. First, 
the Carter administration liberalized domestic US market, by allowing every US-
                                               
1 DOGANIS, R.: The Airline Business, 2006. P. 29. 
owned airline to operate air transportation services between any city pair within the 
USA. Economists from the Brookings Institution and George Mason University 
have estimated that consumers save some $19.4 billion per year thanks to the lower 
fares resulting from a competitive airline marketplace.
2
 In the same year the 
administration started signing liberal ASAs with like-minded countries including the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. R. Doganis calls these “open market” 
agreements.
3
 They set new rules on market access and eliminate capacity and 
frequency restrictions. In the field of price-setting, open market agreements 
introduce the concept of double disapproval – proposed tariffs become operative 
unless they are rejected by both governments (as opposed to the double approval 
method used in pre-1978 ASAs). 
 
In Europe, aviation markets were protected and fragmented, dominated by state-
owned carriers and airports. This began to change in mid-1980s thanks to an effort 
of the European Commission and a 1986 decision of the European Court of Justice. 
The change has been brought about by means of so-called “three liberalization 
packages,” approved between 1987 and 1992. The path of regulatory reform 
culminated with the creation of a single aviation market in 1997. The reform 
introduced a concept of “community carriers” – all the airlines licensed and owned 
by a EU-citizen have equal rights to provide aviation services anywhere in the EU, 
including cabotage. Later, the single market was extended to include Norway, 
Switzerland and Iceland. 
 
In 1992, the US government decided to bring liberalization of its international 
aviation relations to a higher level by starting to conclude “open skies” agreements.  
This inaugurated a new phase of international deregulation. The key elements of 
“open skies” agreements were as follows:4 
 
 open route access – airlines from either signatory country can fly to any 
point in the other with full traffic rights; 
 multiple designation of airlines; 
 unlimited fifth freedom rights; 
 no frequency or capacity control; 
 no tariff controls (unless tariffs are too high or too low); 
 airlines free to code share or make other commercial agreements. 
 
Since 1992, the United States government has signed almost 100 open skies 
agreements with countries all over the world.
5
 It has become a template to follow 
and many other countries have changed their ASAs to comply with the open skies 
                                               
2 POOLE R. – BUTLER, V.: Airline Deregulation..., 1998. P. 6. 
3 DOGANIS, R.: The Airline Business, 2006. P. 32-37. 
4 DOGANIS, R.: Flying Off Course, 2007. P. 62. 
5 For an up-to-date list see: http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-40%20Role_Files/ 
bilatosagreement.htm . 
rules. However, the majority of bilateral ASAs are still restrictive: for each liberal 
ASA there are at least 5-10 restrictive ones. 
 
The most recent example of liberalization tendencies is the US-EU Open Skies Air 
Transport Agreement in force from March 2008. The two regions, being the two 
largest air transport markets in the world and accounting for more than half of all 
global scheduled passenger traffic
6
 opened the North Atlantic market to greater 
competition. The agreement allows all EU and US air carriers to fly from any point 
in the EU to any point in the USA, removes restrictions on air fares, allows airlines 
more freedom to cooperate in marketing arrangements such as leasing, code-sharing 
etc. Thus, it is an important step on the way towards full liberalization of the North 
Atlantic air transport market. Various studies predict it will generate 26 million 
additional passengers, 72,000 new jobs, bring a consumer surplus worth up to €12 
billion,
7
 etc. To sum up, the three main efficiency effects will be cost savings, price 
reductions and output expansion.
8
 
 
However, except for intra-European common aviation market, even the most liberal 
ASAs stop short of full liberalization. US-EU Open Skies Agreement is no 
exception. 
 
 
 
3. Obstacles on the way towards full liberalization 
 
We identify three crucial obstacles on the way towards full liberalization: 
 
 Nationality clauses – almost all the ASAs contain a nationality clause stating 
that “only airlines that are substantially owned and effectively controlled by 
nationals of the signatory state can operate direct service between signatory 
states.”9 For example, Air France (as a French-owned airline) is not allowed 
to operate a direct service from Germany to Canada. Nor is Lufthansa (as a 
German-owned airline) allowed to operate direct service from France to 
Canada. 
 
 Investment restrictions – foreign ownership of airlines is restricted. Usually 
laws don’t allow airlines to sell the majority of their shares to foreign 
companies. In the European Union, the limit is set to 49%, that is, the 
majority share has to be controlled by European citizens. In many countries 
of the world the limit is even lower – the United States keeps it down at 
25%. 
                                               
6 ALFORD, E. – CHAMPLEY, R.: The Impact of the 2007 U.S.-EU…, 2007. P. 1. 
7 Brattle Group: The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area, 2002. P. i. 
8 ROBYN, D. – REITZES, J. – MOSELLE, B.: Beyond Open Skies..., 2005. P. 58. 
9 Ibid. P. 55. 
  Restricted cabotage – cabotage is a right of an airline to operate domestic 
flights in a foreign country. For example, Mexicana (as a Mexican-owned 
airline) would be allowed to operate flights between two US cities. Thus, 
cabotage is the highest level of air transport liberalization. It is restricted in 
99 percent of ASAs. The only noteworthy exceptions are internal market of 
the European Union and a bilateral agreement between Australia and New 
Zealand. 
 
What are the reasons behind these obstacles? After a thorough analysis we divide 
them into four groups. 
 
1. National security issues 
National security is a primary goal of governments everywhere in the world. 
Aircrafts, airports and the whole aviation infrastructure are a vital part of war-time 
strategies of every country. Therefore, governments tend to restrict access to these 
only to domestic investors. 
 
One of the best examples can be found in the United States – a program called Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). As a part of this program “selected aircraft from U.S. 
airlines […] support Department of Defense airlift requirements in emergencies 
when the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft.”10 The program 
is voluntary. However, the airlines that decide to participate get a lucrative access to 
government-funded traffic. Currently more than 1,300 aircraft from all the major US 
carriers are enrolled in the program.
11
 The Department of Defense (DOD) officials 
are concerned that loosening foreign investment restrictions might have negative 
impacts on the willingness of US airlines to participate in the CRAF, especially in 
case they will be owned by foreign companies. Therefore the DOD is likely to block 
all the attempts to liberalize investment rules. 
 
Currently there are more than 19,000 airliners in service. Boeing predicts this 
number will almost double in the next 20 years.
12
 Supposing average capacity of an 
aircraft is 100 passengers and applying simple mathematics we come to a total 
capacity of more than 3 million people in 2027. This means if a single country was 
to own all the aircrafts it would be able to transport more than 3 million soldiers on a 
daily basis. Such a power constitutes a serious global threat. Although the situation 
is clearly hypothetic, it is taken into account by national governments when deciding 
about liberalizing ownership rules. 
 
Another potential security issue of air transport is terrorism. As demonstrated on 
9/11/2001, civil aircraft may be used as a weapon of mass destruction. To minimize 
                                               
10 US Air Force: http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=173  
11 Ibid. 
12 Boeing: Current Market Outlook 2008-2027, 2008. P. 3. 
the risk of terrorism countries seek to execute the highest level of control possible 
over the airlines. This implies not allowing foreign ownership of airlines and 
including nationality clauses in ASAs. 
 
2. Economic security 
All countries view aviation as vital to their national economic well-being. It enables 
personal contact between distant regions and movement of persons, cargo and mail 
between any points in the world within 24 hours. Disruption of air transportation in a 
country could have serious effects on the national economy, especially if we take 
into account that in some markets air transport provides for more than 35% of the 
value of trade. Moreover, some goods (like hi-tech products or perishable goods) 
can only be transported by air. 
 
Some of the most intensive opposition to liberalization of ownership rules comes 
from labor unions. Their members have a legitimate fear of possible discrimination 
by foreign airlines. Exactly as in other industries, investors routinely seek to employ 
the cheapest laborers. For example, airlines could consider hiring Thai flight 
attendants instead of Japanese or American workers, because Thai workers can be 
paid up to 90% less.
13
 In this manner opening the labor market in aviation will lead 
to huge job losses in developed countries. 
 
A general rule states that liberalism prevails in times of welfare and economic 
growth, whereas hard times always wake up protectionist tendencies. These days are 
no exception. Economic security concerns will almost surely intensify as a result of 
the current global crisis. It is hard to imagine a government that would open access 
to its air transport market in times of economic insecurity. 
 
3. Safety 
Another important obstacle are safety concerns of Western countries. Nationality 
clauses and other protective measures in ASAs prevent the emergence of “flags of 
convenience.” In the current regulatory system airlines have a clear national identity 
determined by the identity of their majority shareholder. Thus, every aircraft has to 
be registered and licensed in the country of its owner. If ownership rules were to be 
loosened, airliners could be registered in any country in the world. This would lead 
to an emergence of so-called open registries as we know them from maritime 
transport – countries like Liberia or Panama would set attractive technical rules and 
low taxes in order to have foreign owners register aircrafts in their national registries. 
As a result of this many experts warn that “changing the ownership rules may lose 
protection from flags of convenience, with companies able to escape safety 
regulations and labor laws.” 14  On the other side of the debate, advocates of 
liberalization analyze the situation in maritime transport and come to a conclusion 
that open registries have no adverse impacts on safety. 
                                               
13 WARDEN, J.A.: Open Skies at a Crossroads..., 2003. P. 251. 
14 CHANG, Y. – WILLIAMS, G.: Changing the Rules…, 2001. P. 208. 
 4. National pride 
National carriers, also called flag carriers, are an important element of national pride 
of many countries in the world. For the biggest part of the 20
th
 century civil aviation 
was funded and organized by governments and every country had its own national 
carrier. Although the situation today is different and the largest airlines are no longer 
directly controlled by governments, the merits remain the same: Lufthansa is still 
considered a part of German national pride; Air France is one of the most influential 
French companies; Qantas is as Australian as ever. In many parts of the world it is 
unimaginable that a “flag carrier” might be sold to foreign investors. 
 
As a result of the four factors mentioned, countries are unwilling to open 
international aviation markets to competition and tend to protect their national 
carriers, even if they show low productivity level and their survival is economically 
doubtful. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Most aviation experts agree that nationality rules and investment restrictions have 
become obsolete in a globalized economy. However, the opinions of these experts 
differ from opinion of general public and from policies followed by the majority of 
world governments. We identified various reasons accounting for this fact. Probably 
the most important of them are national security issues, economic protectionism, 
safety concerns and national pride. The world is not governed by a single power that 
would try to maximize global welfare. Rather the world consists of 200 countries, 
each of them following the goals of its own.  
 
Taking into account all the factors mentioned we do not foresee an era of 
intergovernmental cooperation in the field of civil aviation. There are various 
evidences that support our claim: 
 
 There has been a single attempt to liberalize air transportation on global 
level – the Chicago conference of 1944. After its failure to achieve a 
worldwide open aviation area no further attempts have been made, not even 
within the framework of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). 
 
 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) specifically excludes air 
transport from its agenda. 
 
 The United States – as the largest aviation market in the world and former 
driver of change – doesn’t seem to be interested in air transport 
liberalization any more. The Obama government has made clear signals it is 
not willing to revoke restrictions in foreign ownership of US airlines. 
  Currently the only world region willing to advance with liberalization of air 
transport is the European Union. In the atmosphere of global crisis it will 
not achieve its objectives and protectionism will prevail. 
 
Therefore civil aviation of the next decade will still be marked by an “all against all” 
structure. Where unity us unachievable ambivalence wins. 
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